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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
A police officer arrested Dale Sutterfield for a misdemeanor committed outside the
officer's presence. The officer did not have a warrant, and the private citizen who reported the
offense was not present for officer's interactions with Mr. Sutterfield, including the arrest. In
fact, the citizen never tried to detain Mr. Sutterfield or expressed an intent to arrest until the
officer proposed it. Moreover, no one told Mr. Sutterfield of the citizen's intent and authority to
conduct the arrest. And, although the citizen signed a citizen's arrest form (filled out by the
officer), no one gave or showed these forms to Mr. Sutterfield. Accordingly, Mr. Sutterfield
moved to suppress the evidence from a search incident to his warrantless arrest. After reviewing
the totality of the circumstances, the district court found that this was an arrest by an officer, not
a private citizen. The district court granted Mr. Sutterfield's motion to suppress.
The State appealed. The State argues the district court erred by granting Mr. Sutterfield's
motion because the arrest was constitutional.
Mr. Sutterfield submits the district court properly granted his motion because his arrest
violated Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. He asserts an arrest is not
"constitutional" if an officer uses the pretense of a citizen's arrest to work-around the Idaho
Constitution. As found by the district court, this was a warrantless arrest by an officer for a
completed misdemeanor. The State did not meet its burden to prove the private citizen arrested
Mr. Sutterfield, and therefore this Court should affirm the district court's decision and order
suppressing the evidence found on Mr. Sutterfield during the search incident to his
unconstitutional arrest.

1

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the early evening in November 2018, Mr. Sutterfield went into the Mister BBQ
restaurant in Garden City to order food and ask about possible work. (R., p.108.) One of the
employees, Anthony Randolph, noticed Mr. Sutterfield fidgeting around the order counter while
Mr. Randolph and another employee prepared his food. (R., p.108.) Mr. Randolph gave
Mr. Sutterfield his food,1 and Mr. Sutterfield left the restaurant. (R., p.108.) Mr. Sutterfield went
to a nearby laundromat in the same business complex as Mister BBQ. (R., p.108.)
After Mr. Sutterfield left, the Mister BBQ employees noticed that their business cell
phone was gone from its spot on the counter. (R., pp.108-9.) Mr. Sutterfield was the last
customer in the restaurant before the phone went missing. 2 (R., p.109.) Mr. Randolph and
another employee went to the laundromat to confront Mr. Sutterfield. (R., p.109.) Eventually,
Mr. Sutterfield admitted that he took the phone and gave it back to Mr. Randolph. (R., p.109.) He
told Mr. Randolph that he was going to use it to call his family. (R., p.109.) Mr. Sutterfield had
taken the battery and SIM card out of the phone, but, once the employees reassembled it, it
worked again. (R., p.111.) After they got the phone back, Mr. Randolph and the other employee
left the laundromat. (R., p.109.) Mr. Randolph never tried to restrain or arrest Mr. Sutterfield.
(R., p.109.) He also never told Mr. Sutterfield that he was under arrest, that he would be arrested,

or that he needed to stay in the area until the police arrived. (R., p.109.)
After this exchange, Mr. Randolph felt unsafe because he thought Mr. Sutterfield might
have a weapon and he kept reaching around his waist and fidgeting. (R., p.109.) From the
1

Mr. Randolph gave Mr. Sutterfield some extra food, too. (R., p.108.) It was Thanksgiving, and
Mr. Sutterfield was "going through a rough time." (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-16.) Mr. Randolph told
Mr. Sutterfield to check back later for odd jobs around the restaurant or dishwashing. (Tr., p.15,
Ls.17-23, p.17, Ls.2-5.)
2
At some point, Mr. Sutterfield returned to the restaurant for silverware and left again.
(R., p.109.)
2

parking lot by the laundromat, Mr. Randolph called 911 and told dispatch about the phone and
his concerns about Mr. Sutterfield. (R., p.109.) Officer Barghoorn with the Garden City Police
Department arrived at the Mister BBQ about three minutes later. (R., p.109.)
Officer Barghoorn went immediately over to Mr. Sutterfield, who was inside the
laundromat. (R., pp.109-10.) Officer Barghoorn did not speak with Mr. Randolph first.
(R., p.110.) Officer Barghoorn patted Mr. Sutterfield down for weapons, found none, and
handcuffed him. (R., p.110.) After Miranda warnings, Mr. Sutterfield admitted to taking the
phone to call his family. (R., p.110.) Two backup officers stayed with Mr. Sutterfield, and
Officer Barghoorn went to talk to Mr. Randolph. (R., p.110.)
Mr. Randolph told Officer Barghoorn what had happened, and Officer Barghoorn asked
Mr. Randolph and the other employee what they wanted him to do: cite Mr. Sutterfield for theft,
trespass him, or arrest him with a citizen's arrest. (R., p.110.) Officer Barghoorn explained that
he could not arrest Mr. Sutterfield because the crime did not occur in the officer's presence.
(R., p.111.) Mr. Randolph said that he wanted Mr. Sutterfield arrested. (R., p.110.) Officer
Barghoorn filled out an affidavit and a citizen's arrest form, and he had Mr. Randolph sign them.
(R., p.110; State's Exs. 2-3.) Mr. Randolph gave the signed forms to Officer Barghoorn and
returned to work inside Mister BBQ. (R., pp.110-11; see State's Exs. 2-3.) Mr. Randolph never
went back over to Mr. Sutterfield. (R., p.111.) Officer Barghoorn secured the forms in his patrol
car or elsewhere. (R., p.111.) He did not give, read, or show them to Mr. Sutterfield. (R., p.111.)
Officer Barghoorn returned to Mr. Sutterfield. (R., p.111.) He told him, "You are under
arrest for petit theft." (R., p.111.) Officer Barghoorn did not tell him that was making a citizen's
arrest or acting as an agent for Mr. Randolph. (R., p.111.) Officer Barghoorn began to search
Mr. Sutterfield incident to arrest. (R., p.111.) During the search, Mr. Sutterfield asked if "they"
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were pressing charges, and Officer Barghoom said "yep." (R., p.111.) Officer Barghoom found
methamphetamine in a baggie in Mr. Sutterfield's pocket. (R., p.111.) Consequently, Officer
Barghoom arrested Mr. Sutterfield for felony possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.111.)
In December 2018, the State charged Mr. Sutterfield with possession of a controlled
substance, a felony, for the methamphetamine and petit theft, a misdemeanor, for the cell phone.
(R., pp.31-32.) Mr. Sutterfield pied not guilty. (R., pp.50-51.)
Mr. Sutterfield moved to suppress the methamphetamine obtained after his arrest.
(R., pp.72-79.) He argued his arrest violated Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution

because Officer Barghoom arrested him for a misdemeanor committed outside the officer's
presence. (R., pp.74-77.) He also argued Mr. Randolph did not make a lawful citizen's arrest for
the misdemeanor. (R., p.77.) To this end, he contended neither Officer Sutterfield nor
Mr. Randolph complied with Idaho's statutory requirements for a citizen's arrest. (R., p.77.)
The State opposed the motion. (R., pp.83-89.) The State argued there was probable cause
to arrest Mr. Sutterfield for petit theft and the crime occurred in Mr. Randolph's presence, so he
was authorized by statute to make a citizen's arrest. (R., pp.85-87.) In addition, the State
asserted the Idaho statutes allowed Mr. Randolph to "summon assistance" for the arrest, and
Officer Barghoom acted as Mr. Randolph's agent in arresting Mr. Sutterfield. (R., pp.87-88.)
Lastly, the State argued Officer Barghoom discovered the methamphetamine during a lawful
search incident to the arrest. (R., pp.88-89.)
Mr. Sutterfield replied. (R., pp.91-93) He again argued Mr. Randolph did not effectuate a
citizen's arrest. (R., pp.91-93.) Mr. Sutterfield highlighted that Idaho's notice requirements-to
be informed by the person making the arrest of the intent to arrest, the cause of the arrest, and the
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authority for the arrest-were not done. (R., pp.92-93.) He contended this was an arrest by a
police officer, not a citizen or his agent. (R., pp.91-93.)
On August 14, 2019, the district court held a hearing on the motion. (See generally Tr.)
Mr. Randolph and Officer Barghoom testified. (Tr., p.11, L.21-p.34, L.8 (Mr. Randolph), p.35,
L.l-p.53, L.21 (Officer Barghoom).) The district court also admitted Officer Barghoom's
bodycam video and the affidavit and citizen's arrest form. (Tr., p.9, Ls.14-16, p.47, L.24; State's
Exs.2-3; see also Aug. R., State's Ex. 1 (bodycam video).) After argument by the parties, the
district court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.54, L.11-p.63, L.21.)
The next day, August 15, the district court issued a written memorandum decision and
order suppressing the evidence. (R., pp. I 08-18.) The district court provided detailed factual
findings, set forth above, based on Mr. Randolph's and Officer Barghoom's testimony and the
bodycam video. (R., pp.108-12.) In these findings, the district court found that Mr. Sutterfield
committed the misdemeanor offense of petit theft by taking the cell phone and removing the
battery and SIM card. (R., pp.109-10.) The district court also found that this was "a completed
misdemeanor" by the time Officer Barghoom arrived on the scene. (R., p.110.)
At the start of its legal analysis, the district court recognized the parties' stipulation that
Mr. Sutterfield's arrest "was a warrantless arrest and seizure." (R., p.111.) The district court also
acknowledged that the State "does not dispute" that Officer Barghoom did not have the authority
to arrest Mr. Sutterfield because the misdemeanor was committed outside the officer's presence.
(R., p.113.) "Thus," the district court stated, "the issue then is whether there was a valid citizen's
arrest that supported the officer's search of Sutterfield's person which led to the discovery of the
methamphetamine." (R., p.113.)

5

The district court held that there was not a valid citizen's arrest. (R., pp.114-18.) The
district court found no facts to show that Mr. Randolph was making the arrest or having Officer
Barghoom act as his agent. (R., pp.114-18.) First, the district court found that neither
Mr. Randolph nor Officer Barghoom gave Mr. Sutterfield notice, as required by Idaho law, of
Mr. Randolph's intent to arrest and his authority to arrest. (R., p.114.) The district court also
found that Mr. Sutterfield was never shown the citizen's arrest forms filled out by Officer
Barghoom and signed by Mr. Randolph. (R., p.114.) Further, the district court recognized that
Mr. Randolph could have "delivered" Mr. Sutterfield to Officer Barghoom, but that was not
done either. (R., p.144.) Instead, Officer Barghoom "handcuffed, Mirandized, and detained
Sutterfield even before talking with Randolph or receiving [the citizen arrest forms] from
Randolph." (R., p.114.)
Next, the district court distinguished the instant facts from case law relied on by the State
to justify Officer Barghoom's warrantless arrest. (R., pp.114-17.) The district court found that it
was not "impracticable" to comply with Idaho's notice requirements because Mr. Sutterfield was
immediately restrained upon Officer Barghoom's arrival. (R., pp.114-15.) The district court also
found, "Sutterfield was not attempting to resist officers or resisting officers, as evidenced by" the
testimony and Officer Barghoom's bodycam video. (R., p.115.) In sum, the district court
determined that there was no reason for Mr. Randolph or Officer Barghoom to fail to notify
Mr. Sutterfield of Mr. Randolph's alleged intent, cause, and authority to arrest. (R., p.115.)
Lastly, in discussing prior case law, the district court recognized that Mr. Randolph's
"only act to effectuate the citizen's arrest was to sign his name to an affidavit and a citizen's
arrest form." (R., p.116.) Mr. Randolph "did not physically confront Sutterfield about the
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citizen's arrest, in [Mister] BBQ, at the laundromat, in the parking lot, or at the jail." (R., p.116)
The district court concluded:
While Officer Barghoom informed Sutterfield that he was being arrested for petit
theft, Officer Barghoom never indicated in any way to Sutterfield that it was a
citizen's arrest made at the direction and request of Randolph. While
Mr. Randolph's personal presence was not necessary, Officer Barghoom was still
required to provide notice of the authority of the arrest as a citizen's arrest and
that Officer Barghoom was assisting with the arrest and transport of the defendant
under that authority. Could Barghoom have shown the citizen's arrest form to
Sutterfield or read it to Sutterfield to provide sufficient notice? Maybe-but that
clearly did not happen in this case. Based upon all evidence presented at the
hearing, the State has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Sutterfield was provided adequate notice to effect a valid citizen's arrest under the
plain-language ofldaho Code § 19-606. Therefore, the evidence before this Court
is that Sutterfield's arrest was an arrest by an officer. 3 Since the arrest was for a
completed misdemeanor that did not occur in the officer's presence, it was not a
lawful arrest as required by Section 17 of Article I of the Idaho Constitution.
(R., p.117 (emphasis added).) Because the arrest was unlawful, Officer Barghoom's search "was
not incident to a valid arrest." (R., p.118.) Therefore, the district court granted Mr. Sutterfield's
motion and suppressed the methamphetamine as the "fruit" of the unlawful arrest. (R., p.118.)
Also on August 15, 2019, shortly after the district court's decision, Mr. Sutterfield pled
guilty to petit theft. (R., pp.121-22.) The district court dismissed the charge of possession of a
controlled substance. (R., pp.121-22.) The district court sentenced Mr. Sutterfield to 146 days in
jail, with 146 days of credit for time served, and released him. (R., pp.121, 123.) On August 28,
2019, the State filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.124-26.)

3

In a footnote, the district court stated:
Even if this Court found that Barghoom's response to Sutterfield's question of
"So they are pressing charges?" was sufficient notice of a citizen's arrest, the
search of the pockets had been completed immediately before Sutterfield asked
the question. So sufficient statutory notice to effect the arrest was not completed
until the search had already taken place so the search was prior to the citizen's
arrest under this theory as well.

(R., p.118 n.5.)
7

ISSUE
The State frames the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in suppressing the evidence of methamphetamine
possession found incident to arrest because the arrest and search incident thereto
were constitutional?
Mr. Sutterfield rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court properly grant Mr. Sutterfield's motion to suppress evidence
obtained after a police officer arrested him for a completed misdemeanor without
a warrant?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Granted Mr. Sutterfield's Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained
After A Police Officer Arrested Him For A Completed Misdemeanor Without A Warrant

A.

Introduction
The Court should affirm the district court's order granting Mr. Sutterfield's suppression

motion because Officer Barghoom arrested Mr. Sutterfield for a completed misdemeanor without
a warrant, contrary to the Court's recent decision in State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393 (2019).
Aware of Clarke, Officer Barghoom tried to sidestep the Court's decision by offering to do a
citizen's arrest for Mr. Randolph. However, as correctly found by the district court, none of the
facts showed any action or intent to engage in a citizen's arrest, and none of Idaho's statutory
requirements demonstrated a citizen's arrest was actually taking place. On appeal, the State
argues Officer Barghoom's arrest was constitutional because he was acting as Mr. Randolph's
agent. Mr. Sutterfield respectfully disagrees-Officer Barghoom's desire to conduct a citizen's
arrest to avoid the implications of Clarke does not make it a citizen's arrest. The district court
properly ruled this was an arrest by an officer. Therefore, Mr. Sutterfield respectfully requests
this Court affirm the district court's decision.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court applies a
bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). This
Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous
but will freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles to
the facts found. Id.

State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 646--4 7 (201 7).
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C.

The Court Should Affirm The District Court's Order Granting Mr. Sutterfield Motion To
Suppress Because No Evidence Showed The Police Officer Was Acting As The Citizen's
Agent To Allow The Officer's Warrantless Arrest For A Completed Misdemeanor
Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. "In some instances," this Court has "construed Article I, section 17, to
provide greater protection than is provided by the United States Supreme Court's construction of
the Fourth Amendment." State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. amend
IV. The Court provides "greater protection to Idaho citizens based on the uniqueness of our state,
our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence." Id. (quoting State v. Donato, 135 Idaho
469, 472 (2001)).
The Court provided greater protection to Idaho citizens in Clarke. In Clarke, the Court
held Article I, Section 17 prohibited an officer from making a warrantless arrest for a completed
misdemeanor. 165 Idaho at 399. In reaching this landmark decision, the Court considered the
common law practices and statutes before the adoption of the Idaho Constitution in 1890. Id. at
397--400. The Court relied on pre-1890 case law and statutes because that historical common law
could best determine the framers' intent for the rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 17. Id. at
397. After reviewing the common law, the Court concluded "the framers of the Idaho
Constitution understood that Article I, section 17 prohibited warrantless arrests for completed
misdemeanors." Id. at 399. Although the Court was "fully mindful of the significance of this
conclusion," the Court recognized that even "extremely powerful policy considerations ... must
yield" to the constitutional rights afforded to all Idaho citizens. Id. at 400.

Here, there is no dispute that Officer Barghoom did not have an arrest warrant.
(R., p.113.) There is also no dispute that Officer Barghoom arrested Mr. Sutterfield for a
misdemeanor offense, petit theft, committed outside his presence. (R., p.113.) As such, the State
had the burden to justify Officer Barghoom's warrantless arrest of Mr. Sutterfield. See, e.g.,

State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, 341 (2019). The State did not meet its burden.

1.

Idaho's Codification of Common Law on Citizen's Arrest

Similar to the Court's analysis in Clarke, the district court correctly examined Idaho's
statutory requirements on a citizen's arrest to determine Mr. Sutterfield was arrested by an
officer, not a citizen. The district court's focus on Idaho's statutes was appropriate because these
statutes are rooted in the common law and were in effect before the adoption of the Idaho
Constitution. The right for a citizen to arrest arose "in England during the medieval period," and,
"[ a ]t early common law, little or no distinction was made between arrests performed by a private
citizen and those performed by a peace officer .... " Ira P. Robbins, Vilifying the Vigilante: A

Narrowed Scope of Citizen's Arrest, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 557, 563 (2016) (footnotes
omitted). With the rise in state police forces, and the legislative and court's focus on outlining
their authority, the development of the citizen's arrest doctrine fell behind. Id. at 564-65. As
such, many states, including Idaho, codified the common law on citizen's arrest "in an attempt to
provide more clarity to its citizens." Id. at 564-65, 569-72.
Idaho derived its codification of the citizen's arrest doctrine from California. Id. at 569 &
n.73. Almost identical to California law, LC. § 19-601 states: "An arrest is taking a person into
custody in a case and in the manner authorized by law. An arrest may be made by a peace officer
or by a private person." LC. § 19-601; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 834. Idaho Code § 19-604 allows
a private person "to arrest another" ... "[ f]or a public offense committed or attempted in his
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presence." LC. § 19-604(1). California's statute is the same. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 837. Similarly,
Idaho and California both require notice to the arrestee:
The person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the
intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it,
except when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, an offense, or is pursued immediately after its commission,
or after an escape.
LC. § 19-608; see CAL. PENAL CODE§ 841. This notice requirement had a specific purpose in the
common law: "Because every man was privileged to resist unlawful attempts to restrict his
freedom, the common law required notice to be given that an apprehension represented a
citizen's arrest. An arrester was obliged to make known his intent and the cause of the arrest."

The Law of Citizen's Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 502, 507 (1965) (footnote omitted). In addition,
both Idaho and California allow the private citizen to "orally summon as many persons as he
deems necessary to aid him" in the arrest. LC. § 19-606; CAL. PENAL CODE § 839. Finally, the
private citizen "must, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a magistrate, or
deliver him to a peace officer." LC. § 19-614; CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(a). Idaho's statutes were
all in effect in 1887 and, relevant here, these statutes have not changed since 1887. See Revised
Statutes of the Territory ofldaho, Pt. 4 (Penal), Pt. 2 (Of Criminal Procedure) Title III, Ch. V, §§
7538, 7541, 7543, 7545, 7551 (1887). Because Idaho codified its citizen's arrest authority before
the adoption of the Idaho Constitution, these statutes shed light on the framer's understanding of
the requisite actions for a party to make an arrest.

2.

Use ofldaho Arrest Statutes to Identify Citizen's Arrest

Since these statutes codified the common law, it was proper to the district court to
consider them to determine whether Officer Barghoom assisted Mr. Randolph with a citizen's
arrest. Idaho appellate courts have done the same. For example, in State v. Lagasse, the Idaho
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Court of Appeals had to determine whether a security guard conducted a citizen's arrest of the
defendant for petit theft. 135 Idaho 637, 640 (Ct. App. 2001). The Court of Appeals examined
the Idaho's arrest statutes to make that decision. Id. The Court of Appeals also examined whether
the security guard took "some action or intent evidencing custody." Id.; see also State v. Hobson,
95 Idaho 920, 923 (1974) ("Under LC. § 19-601 an arrest is a custodial taking, seizure or
detention, and we believe that there must be some action or intent evidencing police custody
before an arrest occurs."). The Court of Appeals held the security guard's action of "physically
detaining" the defendant "and placing him in handcuffs" showed that intent to place the
defendant in custody. Id. After evaluating the arrest statutes and the security guard's actions,4 the
Court of Appeals concluded the security guard "effectuated a lawful citizen's arrest" of the
defendant. Id. Likewise, in Sima v. Skapps Payless Drug Center, Inc., the Idaho Supreme Court
examined Idaho's arrest statutes to determine whether a citizen validly arrested the defendant
and, after holding as much, held the citizen's search incident to arrest was reasonable. 82 Idaho
387, 391-92 (1960). As another example, in State v. Moore, the Court of Appeals upheld the
district court's determination of citizen's arrest by examining Idaho's arrest statutes. 129 Idaho
776, 779-80 (Ct. App. 1996). The Court of Appeals concluded the citizens "effectuated a valid
citizen's arrest in compliance with LC. § 19-604." Id. at 780. Relatedly, in State v. Sutherland,
130 Idaho 472 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court of Appeals examined Idaho's arrest statutes and

4

The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the security guard did not follow
I.C. § 19-608's notice requirements. The statute does not require notice when the arrestee is
"pursued immediately" after commission of the offense, LC. § 19-608, and the Court of Appeals
determined the security guard arrested the defendant in immediate pursuit. Lagasse, 135 Idaho
640. Here, the State has not argued Officer Barghoom or Mr. Randolph had no statutory duty to
provide notice due to an immediate pursuit. (See also R., p.114 ("There was no evidence
presented that the officers arrived while Sutterfield was engaged in the theft of the phone,
attempting to take the phone, or while anyone was in pursuit of Sutterfield."), p.115 (discussing
that the immediate pursuit exception to notice requirement did not apply).)
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California5 case law to distinguish between an officer's arrest and officer's assistance with a
citizen's arrest. Id. at 474-75. The Court of Appeals agreed that "a police officer can act as an
agent of a citizen who summons assistance in aid of making a citizen's arrest." Id. at 475; see
I.C. § 19-606 (citizen can summon assistance). However, in upholding the citizen's arrest with
officer assistance, the Court of Appeals considered the citizen's compliance with the statutes,
such as directing the office to arrest and providing notice to the arrestee. 130 Idaho at 475-76.
As shown by Lagasse, Sima, Moore, and Sutherland, Idaho appellate courts have consistently
and repeatedly examined Idaho's arrest statutes to determine whether a private citizen or an
officer made the arrest.
The appellate courts' use of the arrest statutes to identify a citizen's arrest illustrates a
critical distinction for the Court's analysis. The State contends the statutes are not relevant
because the Court has held a statutory violation does not warrant suppression of the evidence.
(App. Br., pp.8-9.) State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 889, 892 (2015) (suppression "inappropriate"
when violation is "statutory in nature"). So, according to the State, even if Officer Barghoom and
Mr. Randolph violated Mr. Sutterfield's statutory arrest rights, Mr. Sutterfield could not seek
suppression of the evidence. (App. Br., pp.8-9.) The State has oversimplified the issue. Officer
Barghoom's and Mr. Randolph's violation of Mr. Sutterfield's statutory rights is not why the
evidence must be suppressed. The evidence must be suppressed because Officer Barghoom
conducted a warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor. The statutes are only relevant
inasmuch as they guide the Court's determination of whether the citizen or the officer conducted
the arrest.

5

The Sutherland Court also considered an Alaska case, which had adopted California's
approach. See Sutherland, 130 Idaho at 474-75 (discussing Moxie v. State, 662 P.2d 990 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1983)).
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Put another way, the Court's analysis on the legality of Mr. Sutterfield's arrest 1s
two-fold. First, the Court uses the statutes and case law to determine who arrested
Mr. Sutterfield. Second, with that determination made, the Court decides whether that arrest, by
that arresting party, was constitutional. Here, as discussed next in Part C.3, the statutes and case
law show Officer Barghoom, not Mr. Randolph, arrested Mr. Sutterfield. Then, with that
determination as Officer Barghoom as the arresting party, Clarke establishes that the arrest was
not constitutional. See 165 Idaho at 399.
As a final note, the State's position leaves the Court with little guidance to identify the
arresting party-besides the officer's stated intent and the State's post-hoc evaluation. 6 This
critical distinction (between identifying the arresting party and the constitutionality of the arrest)
gives meaning to Clarke. Without it, an officer could simply claim that he was making a citizen's
arrest and the arrest would be constitutional. And, on the citizen's end, any citizen that reports a
crime could be held responsible for making a citizen's arrest, even if that citizen did not intend to
arrest. Thus, any realization of Clarke's constitutional protections would be tied to the officer's
representations and the post-hoc justification for the arrest. This would greatly diminish Clarke's
aim to preserve the constitutional right of Idaho citizens to be free from warrantless arrests for
completed misdemeanors. As required by the statutes and case law, the citizen must express an
intent to arrest, take some action to arrest, act without delay, and provide notice. Those

6

Mr. Sutterfield notes that the State does not propose any test or guidelines for the Court to
identify the arresting party, other than the fact that the citizen agreed to the officer's option to
arrest and signed the form. (App. Br., p.10 ("The facts show that the officer effectuated a
citizen's arrest based on a citizen's oral and written request.").) Thus, no matter the officer's and
citizen's other conduct at the scene or their intentions, if the citizen at some point requests an
arrest and signs the form, that would be sufficient, as a matter oflaw, to create a citizen's arrest.
This completely upends Clarke's constitutional protections.
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requirements adequately protect these constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court should reject the
State's position.

3.

Application ofldaho's Arrest Statutes to Officer Barghoom's Actions

Considering the arrest statutes and case law, the totality of the circumstances show
Officer Barghoom arrested Mr. Sutterfield. None of statutory procedures were followed to
indicate Mr. Randolph conducted the arrest personally or through Officer Barghoom as his
agent.
As found by the district court, Mr. Randolph did not take Mr. Sutterfield into custody
(LC. § 19-601), provide Mr. Sutterfield notice (LC. § 19-608), orally summon aid for the arrest
(LC. § 19-606), or deliver Mr. Sutterfield to a police officer or magistrate (LC. § 19-614).
Instead:
When Randolph and the other employee confronted Sutterfield at the laundromat
about stealing the phone, the[y] did not detain Sutterfield, ask him to stay until
police arrived, or inform Sutterfield that they were placing him under arrest for
the petit theft. While Randolph could summons a police officer to aid him in
making the arrest pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-606, the police officer could only
assist Randolph in making the arrest and Randolph was still statutorily required to
... follow the notice requirements of Idaho Code § 19-608. While Barghoom
could assist with filling out Exhibits 2 and 3, and Randolph could sign them, the
forms were never shown to Sutterfield and Randolph never told Sutterfield that he
was arresting him, the basis, or that it was a citizen's arrest as the authority to
make the arrest. While Randolph could have delivered Sutterfield to a peace
officer under Idaho Code § 19-614, that did not occur. The officer handcuffed,
Mirandized, and detained Sutterfield even before talking with Randolph or
receiving Exhibits 2 and 3 from Randolph. It was not Randolph that informed
Sutterfield of the basis for the arrest-either orally or in writing. Then, when
Barghoom told Sutterfield of his arrest for petit theft, Barghoom did not provide
the written notice of the citizen's arrest or orally inform Sutterfield of the citizen's
arrest and Randolph was not present.
(R., p.114.) The district court also stated:
Here, the Court finds no evidence that Randolph informed Sutterfield of the
intention to arrest, cause of the arrest, or authority for the arrest. While Officer
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Barghoom informed Sutterfield that he was being arrested for petit theft, Officer
Barghoom never indicated in any way to Sutterfield that it was a citizen's arrest
made at the direction and request of Anthony Randolph. While Mr. Randolph's
personal presence was not necessary, Officer Barghoom was still required to
provide notice of the authority of the arrest as a citizen's arrest and that Officer
Barghoom was assisting with the arrest and transport of the defendant under that
authority. Could Barghoom have shown the citizen's arrest form to Sutterfield or
read it to Sutterfield to provide sufficient notice? Maybe-but that clearly did not
happen in this case. Based upon all evidence presented at the hearing, the State
has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Sutterfield was
provided adequate notice to effect a valid citizen's arrest under the plain-language
of Idaho Code § 19-606. Therefore, the evidence before this Court is that
Sutterfield's arrest was an arrest by an officer.
(R., p.117.) In short, the district court found that Mr. Randolph neither engaged in any action nor
indicated any intent to arrest of his own volition. Instead, once Officer Barghoom posed the
option of arresting Mr. Sutterfield, Mr. Randolph agreed and signed the form later filled out by
Officer Barghoom.
Relied on by the district court, Sutherland, 130 Idaho 4 72, is instructive to show a proper
citizen's arrest. (See R., pp.116-17.) In Sutherland, two women, Gomaa and Sutherland, got into
a fight at a bar. 130 Idaho at 473. Gomaa asked the bartender to call the police. Id. at 475. When
the officers arrived, Gomaa asked for Sutherland be arrested for battery, and she told the officer
that Sutherland might have a weapon in her purse. Id. The officer "approached Sutherland, who
was standing several feet away from Gomaa, and informed her that Gomaa wanted her placed
under citizen's arrest." Id. Later, the officer told Sutherland again that "she was being detained
because Gomaa intended to make a citizen's arrest for the alleged battery." Id. The officer took
Sutherland to the police department. Id. Gomaa went as well. Id. "Before Sutherland was
booked, Gomaa filled out a citizen's arrest form, signed it and informed Sutherland that she was
placing her under citizen's arrest for battery." Id. Based on those facts, the Court of Appeals held
Gomaa effected a citizen's arrest of Sutherland with police assistance. Id. at 475-76. Unlike the
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facts here, Gomaa told the police upon arrival that she wanted to Sutherland arrested, the officer
told Sutherland twice about the citizen's arrest, Gomaa filled out the arrest form herself, Gomaa
went to the police station, and Gomaa told Sutherland about the citizen's arrest. Id. In fact, the
Court of Appeals recognized, "At the police station, Gomaa completed the necessary
documentation for the citizen's arrest, and followed the requirements set forth in LC. [§] 19608." Id. at 476. Mr. Randolph did not engage in similar conduct or express an intent to arrest,
besides signing the arrest form upon Officer Barghoom's prompt. Mr. Randolph did not
immediately tell Officer Barghoom about wanting to arrest Mr. Sutterfield, Officer Barghoom
did not tell Mr. Sutterfield about the citizen's arrest, Mr. Randolph did not fill out the arrest
form, Mr. Randolph did not go the police station, and Mr. Randolph did not tell Mr. Sutterfield
about the citizen's arrest.
The State focuses solely on Mr. Sutterfield's lack of notice to challenge the district
court's determination of Officer Barghoom's arrest. (App. Br., pp.7-10.) As discussed above, it
was appropriate for the district court to consider Mr. Sutterfield's lack of notice, as that is one of
the statutory requirements to identify the arresting party. See also Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho
667, 34 P.2d 957, 962 (1934) (holding that two officers' attempt to arrest of the defendant was
''unlawful" because the officers did not provide him notice under LC. § 19-608). Setting that
aside, the State is incorrect that the district court only examined the lack of notice. The district
court's extensive analysis, (R., pp.113-18), considered multiple factors from the arrest statutes
and case law. The district court recognized: (1) Mr. Randolph and the other employee did not
engage in any action to detain or arrest Mr. Sutterfield before Officer Barghoom's arrival
(LC.§ 19-601); (2) Mr. Randolph did not summon Officer Barghoom to aid him in the arrest
(LC. § 19-606); and (3) Mr. Randolph did not deliver Mr. Sutterfield to Officer Barghoom
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(LC.§ 19-614). (R., pp.114, 116-17.) Thus, the district court considered far more than
Mr. Sutterfield's lack of notice to determine Officer Barghoom arrested him.
The State also maintains "a hypothetical" demonstrates the "flaw in the district court's
reasoning." (App. Br., p.8.) In this hypothetical, Officer Barghoom responded to Mr. Randolph's
call to dispatch and immediately arrested Mr. Sutterfield (which he essentially did). (App.
Br., p.8.) Then, hypothetically, Officer Barghoom told Mr. Sutterfield that he was conducting a
citizen's arrest "based on the call to dispatch." (App. Br., p.8.) The State asserts this could not be
a proper citizen's arrest:
Certainly the district court would not have accepted the argument that the
officer's representations alone showed the arrest to be a citizen's arrest or
transformed the officer's arrest into a citizen's arrest.
(App. Br., p.8.) Mr. Sutterfield agrees. The district court, of course, would not have to accept
Officer Barghoom's representation that he conducted a citizen's arrest to make it such. 7 That
would eviscerate Clarke. Yet, the State misses the mark on its next logical jump:
It makes no more logical sense to conclude that the officer's failure to inform
Sutterfield that the arrest was a citizen's arrest alone showed the arrest was not a
citizen's arrest or transformed the citizen's arrest into an officer arrest. What
information Sutterfield was told did not change the underlying facts nor the
underlying authority for the arrest.
(App. Br., p.8.) The problem with the State's reasoning is it conflates the arresting party with the
legality of the arrest. If Officer Barghoom arrived at the scene and immediately arrested
Mr. Sutterfield, as in the hypothetical, without informing him that the arrest was a citizen's
arrest, there would be no question that the arrest was by Officer Barghoom. Officer Barghoom
took physical custody of Mr. Sutterfield. However, if the purported arresting party changes to a

7

Conversely, if Mr. Randolph physically took Mr. Sutterfield into custody, gave him notice of
the arrest, and delivered him to Officer Barghoom, the district court would not have to accept
any representation that this was an arrest by an officer. State v. Howard, 155 Idaho 666, 673 (Ct.
App. 2013) (trial court has power to assess credibility and resolve factual conflicts).
19

citizen, so does the importance of the statutory requirements. 8 If Officer Barghoom arrived at the
scene and immediately arrested Mr. Sutterfield, without informing him that the arrest was a
citizen's arrest, but perhaps Mr. Randolph had told dispatch that he wanted to arrest
Mr. Sutterfield, the lack of notice matters. That statutory requirement informs the Court's
analysis to determine who actually arrested Mr. Sutterfield. The failure to give notice in that
scenario establishes that the arrest was by Officer Barghoom, not Mr. Randolph, despite
Mr. Randolph's stated intention to dispatch. Sima, 82 Idaho at 391-92; Lagasse, 135 Idaho at
640; Sutherland, 130 Idaho at 474-76; Moore, 129 Idaho at 779-80. Contrary to the State's
assertion, it does make "more logical sense" to determine that an officer's failure to inform the
defendant of a citizen's arrest shows that the arrest was not a citizen's arrest. (App. Br., p.8.) It
also makes "more logical sense" to determine that a citizen's failure to inform the defendant of a
citizen's arrest shows that the arrest was not a citizen's arrest. (App. Br., p.8.) Mr. Sutterfield's
knowledge-and when, how, and where he obtained that knowledge-changes the hypothetical
and "the underlying authority for the arrest." (App. Br., p.8.) Once again, the State's hypothetical
has oversimplified the issue.
Ultimately, Mr. Sutterfield agrees with the State's assertion that "the compliance or
non-compliance with the notice requirements of LC. § 19-608" is not grounds for suppression.
(App. Br., p.8.) The district court recognized this as well. (R., pp.113, 117-18.) The problem for
the State is that the non-compliance with LC. § 19-608, along with other facts, proves
Mr. Randolph did not arrest Mr. Sutterfield. As found by the district court, there was no evidence
that Mr. Randolph did any action or expressed any intent to arrest Mr. Sutterfield before Officer
8

In the end, the lack of notice does not really matter when an officer is indisputably the arresting
party because that statutory violation would not provide for suppression of the evidence. See Part
C.2. Certainly, as is the case here, there could be other issues with the legality of the arrest once
the officer is identified as the arresting party.
20

Barghoom offered the citizen's arrest option, and there is no evidence that Mr. Randolph did
some action during or after Officer Barghoom's arrest (like giving Mr. Sutterfield notice) to
evidence an intent to arrest. See Lagasse, 135 Idaho at 640 ("Furthermore, by physically
detaining Lagasse and placing him in handcuffs, the security guard took action that evidenced his
intent to place Lagasse in custody."). Without any notice to Mr. Sutterfield, Mr. Randolph's
signature on the citizen's arrest form shows nothing more than his approval of Officer
Barghoom's arrest. In other words, the district court aptly assessed that Officer Barghoom's
attempt to avoid the implications of Clarke with a citizen's arrest form did not make it a citizen's
arrest. "Therefore," as properly ruled by the district court, "the evidence ... is that Sutterfield's
arrest was an arrest by an officer." (R., p.117.) Accordingly, Officer Barghoom arrested
Mr. Sutterfield without a warrant for a completed misdemeanor, in violation of Clarke. The
Court should affirm the district court's decision and order suppressing the evidence from the
search incident to Mr. Sutterfield's unconstitutional arrest.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Sutterfield respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order granting
his motion to suppress.
DATED this 11 th day of August, 2020.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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